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Adopting and Adjusting to the Development of
the Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Mechanism in China’s Recent Bilateral
Investment Treaty Negotiations with the
European Union
BY RUNYANG LIU
ABSTRACT
The Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism has been
widely used in international treaty-making and invoked many times in
cross-border dispute resolution. ISDS is a system where a foreign investor
can bring claims against a host state for its discriminatory acts upon the
investor. As China pursues a new level of outbound investment in the last
decade, the ISDS mechanism will apply particularly in the context of
investment disputes involving Chinese investors and foreign countries.
This note will examine the evolution of ISDS clauses in China’s Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs), especially with the European Union (EU), as
well as these clauses’ implications for Chinese investors seeking remedies
under the ISDS clauses. It will start by exploring the context in which the
discussion of ISDS arises and some of the main criticisms raised against
ISDS clauses in recent years. It will then assess ISDS clauses in China’s
BITs and some challenges when consolidating different versions of ISDS
provision, followed by a case study of arbitration between Chinese
investors and Belgium. When seeking to challenge a state’s action that
violates an investor’s rights and interests, ISDS provides limited remedial
protection to investors and presents disadvantages to Chinese investors
that the Chinese government should be aware of while drafting BITs with
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the EU. In its ongoing and future treaty negotiations, China should
provide a clear-lined arbitral scope, limit uncertainties in its treaty
language, and install mechanisms to remedy the lack of transparency in the
ISDS system, all while taking into account the importance of its state
interests.

I. Introduction of ISDS
A. Background
Historically, a foreign investor has two ways to seek a remedy when
the host state interferes with an investment: either through a local court or
administrative body in the host state or through espousal of a claim of
diplomatic protection from the investor’s home country. Neither channel is
perfect, and in many occasions both have been ineffective in redressing
investors’ problems.1 By contrast, ISDS provides a fair opportunity for
foreign investors to challenge state actions.
ISDS is widely used in many international treaties and investment
agreements. It is a mechanism for settlement between investors and host
states for disputes arising from state actions that affords both parties fair
hearings before a neutral, impartial tribunal.2 ISDS serves as a more
flexible settlement device and affords readily enforceable remedies to
private parties in international investment disputes.3 Both parties have
control, to some extent, over the dispute resolution process. For
arbitrations administered by the International Center for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), parties have the freedom to choose among
arbitrators provided by ICSID.4
Because of an emerging need for a neutral forum for investor-state
cases, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States established ICSID in 1966.5 ICSID is
1. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNCTAD), InvestorState Dispute Settlement UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements
II (United Nations 2014), 23.
2. Id. at 13.
3. Id.
4. See The ICSID Caseload Statistics (Issue 2017-2), ICSID Website, https://icsid.
worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20(English)
%20Final.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) (more than 70% of arbitrators were selected by the
parties).
5. About ICSID, ICSID Website, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/default.
aspx (last visited Jan. 27, 2018).
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considered to be an independent and depoliticized institution for
international investment dispute settlement.6 Some other popular forums
designated by International Investment Agreements (IIAs) and BITs other
than domestic courts or administrative bodies and domestic arbitration
committees include the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),
and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC).
More than half of ICSID cases involve BITs that give rise to ICSID
jurisdiction.7 Some standard provisions that are central to the ISDS clauses
include consent to arbitration, available arbitration forums, and the types of
investor-state claims covered by ICSID.8 Most respondents in ISDS cases
consist of developing countries, while there is also an increasing trend of
cases being brought against developed countries.9
In essence, ISDS provisions in BITs provide a tool that states can use
to guarantee remedies for investors if any dispute arises. There are two
major approaches in constructing the ISDS clause in treaties. The
traditional approach essentially allows the tribunal to review a broad range
of ISDS claims.10 The other approach exhibits a recent development which
limits the scope of ISDS claims with the goal of affording a more
predictable and effective process for parties involved.11 As explored
further below, this difference has fueled problems of inconsistent
interpretations of ISDS provisions.

B. Criticisms of ISDS
1. Difficult in conforming to the volatility in state policy
During the past few decades, ISDS has been widely criticized for its
institutional deficiencies. Since many investors have brought claims
against states’ public policies, a factor that is often unpredictable before the
investments take place, ISDS cannot conform to the changing nature of
public policy in host states.12 Relatedly, volatility in the economic and
political environment, such as the financial crisis of 2008 create additional
problems. For example, in Ping An v. Belgium (more detailed discussion in
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Supra note 4.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 1920.
Supra note 1, at 16.
Id.
Supra note 1, at 13.
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Section III below), due to the financial crisis, the Belgian government
executed a state rescue plan tantamount to an expropriation that cost Ping
An Insurance a large portion of its investment in Belgium.13 The
unpredictability of the market, among so other factors, may drastically
change a state’s standing on a certain policy, and is often hard to foresee by
foreign investors.

2. Lack of predictability and coherence in decisions
Unlike judicial decisions, arbitral awards are usually confidential.
Sometimes international arbitral awards are decided only on jurisdictional
grounds and not on the merits of the case.14 The awards are occasionally
found to be inconsistent with the judgments in previous awards due to
different or even contradicting interpretations of treaty provisions, which
ultimately lead to difficulty in predicting ongoing and future cases.15
Different tribunals interpret the same treaty language or similar facts
differently.16 There is also an increasing trend of structuring investments
under multiple investment treaties and forum shopping, which creates more
likelihood for inconsistent decisions.17
This lack of consistency unavoidably impacts the credibility of the
arbitral tribunals, and lead parties to question the effectiveness and fairness
of the ISDS mechanism. However, investors can challenge the award
according to the ICSID Convention through the annulment process.18 19
But non-ICSID awards, such as those under the New York Convention, do

13. Ping An Life Insurance Company of China Ltd. and Ping An Insurance (Group)
Company of China Ltd. v. Kingdom of Belgium, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29, Award
(2015).
14. See ICSID Convention art. 41(2): “Any objection by a party to the dispute that that
dispute is not within the jurisdiction of the Centre, or for other reasons is not within the
competence of the Tribunal, shall be considered by the Tribunal which shall determine
whether to deal with it as a preliminary question or to join it to the merits of the dispute.”
15. Supra note 1, at 27.
16. S. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1545–46
(2005).
17. Id. at 1546.
18. Id. at 1547.
19. ICSID Convention art. 52(1): upon receipt of party’s request, an ad hoc committee
of three persons may fully or partially annul an award on the basis of one of more of the
following grounds: a) the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) the Tribunal manifestly
exceeded its powers; (c) there was corruption on the part of a Tribunal member; (d) there
was a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) the award failed to
state the reasons on which it is based.
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not allow an annulment procedure, and an investor may be left to seek a
court order to set aside or vacate the award.20
Furthermore, there is no immediate remedy to cure an ill-decided
award or an inefficient appellate mechanism.21 Even though claimants
sometimes can ask a court to convert the arbitral award into a formal
judgment, many courts, especially in the U.S., are often deferential to the
arbitral tribunal. Therefore, some have argued for an institutional reform of
the arbitration system that incorporates either an internal review and
guidance system, or an appellate system.22 However, both proposals cast
doubts on the difficulty of designing and implementing such systems, and
whether they would accommodate the variances and complexities from
different treaties.

3. Lack of transparency in judgment-making and selecting tribunal
members
So far, 64 percent of the ICSID cases were decided by arbitral
tribunals, while the remaining cases were settled or discontinued.23 Many
arbitrations are performed on an ad hoc basis, and arbitrators are sometimes
questioned for the sufficiency of their knowledge and experience. Some
criticize tribunals for their expansion of its arbitration jurisdiction when
interpreting treaty clauses.24 When facing erroneous decisions or an
annulment, many cases are not subject to appellate review. The only
remedy left for investors then is to bring another action.
In addition, not all awards are made public, and many proceedings are
confidential unless parties agree to waive confidentiality.25 Because many
investor-State disputes involve public welfare and public interest, private
arbitral proceedings has raised concerns over lack of transparency, and has
been one of the main criticisms against the ISDS system.26 Therefore,
publication of awards might be one way to facilitate a more transparent
20. Id. at 1549-50.
21. G. Kaufmann-Kohler & M. Potestà, Can the Mauritius Convention serve as a model
for the reform of investor-State arbitration in connection with the introduction for a
permanent investment tribunal or an appeal mechanism? CIDS – Geneva Center for
International Dispute Settlement, ¶ 22 (June 3, 2016), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/CIDS_Research_Paper_Mauritius.pdf.
22. Supra note 15, at 1601.
23. Supra note 1.
24. U. Grušic, The Evolving Jurisdiction of the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes, J. WORLD INVE. & TRADE, vol. 10, no. 1, 100 (Feb. 2009).
25. Supra note 1, at 13–14.
26. Supra note 19.
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arbitral processing system and provide a legal framework which the public
perceives as more reliable and consistent.
Another issue involving arbitral tribunals lies in their appointment
procedure. The appointment of arbitrators is questioned largely for its lack
of impartiality in the appointing process.27 ICSID arbitrators are subject to
ethical rules; nevertheless, there has been an increasing amount of
challenges to their impartiality and ability.28 Critics note a rising concern
over conflicts of interest, as some arbitrators are repeatedly appointed as
tribunal members, and at the same time hired as counsels for related parties
in other proceedings.29

4. Relative difficulties faced by small enterprises and individual
investors
Small- and medium-sized companies and individuals accounted for
half of the class brought under international arbitrations.30 Some scholars
who researched ISDS cases, however, found that the average cost of each
case is more than USD 8 million per party, and can exceed USD 30
million.31 This figure is an enormous barrier to bringing claims for smalland medium-sized companies and individuals. For host states, it is also a
huge expense that must somehow come from government budgets and
therefore burdens small, developing countries. Some cases are not only
expensive but take a long time before the arbitral tribunals render an award.
Meanwhile, foreign investors from outside certain economic regions
might face even greater challenges to bringing actions against states. For
example, an investor from the U.S. might have fewer advantages than an
investor from Germany if suing France. In fact, according to a report by
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), EU
countries who have been sued recently in investor-State claims more often
than in the past.32 In 2013 and 2014, forty-two percent and twenty-five
27. Id.
28. Supra note 1, at 27–28.
29. S. Schacherer, Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators: A Rule of Law
Analysis, Jan. 2018, https://deicl.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/i_deicl/VR/VR_Per
sonal/Reinisch/Internetpublikationen/Schacherer.pdf.
30. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Fact Sheet: Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) (Mar. 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds.
31. D. Gaukrodger & K. Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper
for the Investment Policy Community, OECD Working Papers on International Investment,
2012/03 (OECD Publishing 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en.
32. European Commission, Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Some Facts and
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percent of the total new disputes were brought against EU countries,
respectively, while fifty-six percent of the total new disputes were brought
by European investors.33
Despite these criticisms, ISDS predominates most of China’s modern
BITs. China’s increasing appearances in investor-State arbitration are one
of the results of implementing ISDS provision in its BIT.34 The next
section will examine the development of China’s BITs and its adoptions of
ISDS provisions of both the European model as well as American model.

II. ISDS Provisions in BITS that China has Concluded
A. Evolution of Chinese BITs
Among the BITs and Treaties with Investment Provisions (TIPs) that
China concluded, 129 BITs and 19 TIPs are currently in force.35 The first
generation of Chinese IIAs and BITs were very restrictive and signed
mostly with developed European countries. The ISDS provisions in these
early treaties only covered disputes regarding the amount of compensation
in the event of expropriation.36 During most of the 1990s, China continued
this practice and entered into more agreements with developing countries.
In 1998, China concluded an investment treaty with Barbados, which
included a broader ISDS clause allowing investors to submit “any dispute”
with host states to international arbitration.37 Thereafter, China started to
include more liberal ISDS provisions that give more weight to international
arbitration and some now-common ISDS standards such as national
treatments.38,39 With its expanding outbound and inbound investment

Figures, 6-7, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153046.pdf.
33. Id.
34. D. Pathirana, A Look into China’s Slowly Increasing Appearance in ISDS Cases.
Investment Treaty News (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/09/26/a-look-intochinas-slowly-increasing-appearance-in-isds-cases-dilini-pathirana/#_edn4.
35. See
International
Investment
Agreements
Navigator,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/IiasByCountry#footnote (last visited Feb. 19,
2018).
36. A. Berger, China’s Recent Approach to International Investment Rule-Making, 16 J.
World INVE. & TRADE 843, 845-48 (2015).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 849.
39. See e.g., Sino-UK BIT art. 3(3): “either Contracting Party shall to the extent
possible, accord treatment in accordance with the stipulations of its laws and regulations to
the investments of national or companies of the other Contracting Party the same as that
accorded to its own nationals or companies.”
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policies in recent years, China started to develop more comprehensive
ISDS provisions in BIT negotiations. In its negotiations with the U.S. and
the EU, China continues to adopt this broader and more balanced
investment treaty provision.40
Since 2007, when the first arbitration claim was brought by a Chinese
investor against a host state,41 there have been six cases filed before the
ICSID, two of which have concluded.42 Only one case is against an EU
country.43 Chinese investors started to employ the ISDS provisions as an
alternative to litigation in the last decade. With the increasing amount of
investments between China and EU countries, Chinese investors are more
likely to continue using ISDS provisions to protect their interests.

B. Comparison of China’s Current Treaties
1. BITs Based on the European Model
China has concluded BITs with 26 EU member states.44 China and
the EU launched their negotiation rounds for BIT (EU-China BIT) in 2013,
and started their thirteenth round of negotiation in 2017.45 The new EUChina BIT, when concluded, will replace all the current BITs between
China and EU countries. The ISDS provision in the EU-China BIT will
likely adopt some part of the ISDS provisions from current BITs between
China and EU member states.
The Ministry of Commerce of China drafted a model BIT in 2010 and
drew heavily from the traditional European model.46 For example, Article
15 of the 2010 model BIT stipulates that this agreement applies to “all
investment made before and after this agreement comes into force,” but
does not apply to “disputes arising before this agreement comes into
force.”47 This is similar to Article 10.2 in China’s BIT with Belgium in
40. Id.
41. See generally, Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6.
42. See id., and Ping An v. Belgium, supra note 13.
43. See Ping An v. Belgium, supra note 13.
44. How to Understand the China-EU Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiation, Institute
of European Studies of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, August 21, 2017.
45. China, EU starts 13th Round of BIT Negotiations, Xinhua Net, http://www.
xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/16/c_136288358.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
46. J. Xiao, How can a prospective China-EU BIT contribute to sustainable investment:
in light of the UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, J.
WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. (2015) 8 (6) 521.
47. This Model BIT was not officially published, but discussed by X. Wen in
Discussion on “China Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (draft)” (Part Three). 19(2) Guo
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2009, which stated that the Agreement applies to “all investment made…
before or after the entry into force of this Agreement,” but not to disputes
or claims “concerning an investment which was already under judicial or
arbitral process before its entry into force.”48
The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)
between the EU and Canada is one of the most recent trade agreements that
the EU concluded after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in December
2009. CETA’s investment section contains some of the most commonlyused clauses of the European model, including national treatment, fair and
equitable treatment, full protection and security, expropriation, and free
transfers. The most reformative aspect of CETA is the EU and Canada’s
joint advocacy of a multilateral investment court to replace the ad hoc
arbitral tribunals.49 CETA also initiated some innovative ISDS features in
an effort to increase transparency of the ISDS system, and to strengthen
trust in arbitrators’ credentials and experiences.50
The China-Canada BIT concluded in 2012 and is considered to be the
most comprehensive BIT China has signed.51 It has set out new procedures
and rules for ISDS.52 CETA and China-Canada BIT share many
commonalities which the EU-China BIT may include, such as the
requirement of expertise in public international law for arbitrators and a
waiver clause to prevent parallel proceedings.53

2. BITs Based on the U.S. Model
Other than the popular European model, China has also been
consistently adopting provisions from the U.S. model in an effort to restrict
arbitration. This rather strict feature can be traced back to those early BITs
Ji Jing Ji Fa Xue Kan (2011), http://www.chinesejiel.com/upFj/中国投资保护协定范本（
三）.doc (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
48. Agreement between the Government of the People′s Republic of China and the
Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, P.R.C-B.L.E.U, art. 10.2, June 6, 2005 (came into force on Jan. 12, 2009).
49. A. Roberts, The Shifting Landscape of Investor-State Arbitration: Loyalists,
Reformists, Revolutionaries and Undecideds, EJIL: Talk June 15, 2017, https://www.ejiltalk
.org/the-shifting-landscape-of-investor-state-arbitration-loyalists-reformists-revolutionariesand-undecideds (last visited March 20, 2018).
50. R. García-Gallardo & X. Jin, The E.U.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty. China
Law Insight, http://cn.swisscham.org/sites/default/files/The%20E.U.%20-%20China%20Bil
ateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf (last visited March 20, 2018).
51. Supra note 41.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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that China concluded, and was due largely to China’s role as an Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) importing country, positioning itself as a state that
avoids cross-border investment disputes.54 The U.S. has adopted a more
defined and restricted ISDS model in its agreements with other countries.55
The China-Colombia BIT was adopted after the U.S. model and
implemented many mechanisms to restrain a tribunal’s jurisdiction in some
areas, such as essential security.56 It excluded arbitral tribunal jurisdiction
on disputes arising from the most favored nation treatment.57 It also
required investors, who claim expropriation arising from taxes, to first
exhaust their remedies with the host state’s tax department and let the state
government decide whether the taxation amounts to expropriation.58
Indeed, China’s investment treaties in the last decade have largely
adopted the American model. In addition to the China-Colombia BIT, the
China-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (FTA) completely adopted the
fair and equitable treatment from the U.S. BIT Model of 2004, and the
China-Mexico BIT completely borrowed the fair and equitable treatment
from the U.S. BIT Model of 2004.59 For example, both China and the U.S.
require four conditions—due process, non-discrimination, public interest,
and effective compensation—to render expropriation. 60
In conclusion, the ISDS provisions in CETA, the China-Canada BIT,
and China’s model BIT of 2010 will likely be used as blueprints for the
EU-China BIT that is currently undergoing negotiation. The recent BITs
with large influence from the American models also indicate that China is
moving toward the American model regarding investment protection and
dispute settlement.61 China has shown willingness to adopt parts of the
54. Axel Berger, China’s New Bilateral Investment Treaty Programme: Substance,
Rational and Implications for International Investment (Nov. 2008), 910, https://www.diegdi.de/uploads/media/Berger_ChineseBITs.pdf.
55. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Fact Sheet: Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS) (Mar. 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds.
56. A. Irwin, Crossing the Ocean by Feeling for the BITs: Investor-State Arbitration in
China’s Bilateral Investment Treaty, GEGI Working Paper (May 2014), 24, https://www.bu.
edu/pardeeschool/files/2014/11/China’s-Bilateral-Investment-Treaties-Working-Paper.pdf.
57. Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments Between the
Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government of the People’s Republic of
China, art. 3(3).
58. Id. art. 14(5).
59. C. Cai, China-US BIT Negotiations and the Future of Investment Treaty Regime: A
Grand Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral Implications, J. INT’L ECON. LAW, Volume 12,
Issue 2 (June 2009), 468–69.
60. Id. at 475.
61. Id. at 485-86.
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American Model BIT of 2012, including intellectual property rights, and
labor and environment protection.62 Since China is negotiating BITs with
the EU and the U.S. at the same time, this may be the time for China to
consolidate conflicting provisions between the American model and the
European model from the past. The experiences of Chinese investors with
ISDS to date can help guide this consolidation process as well as other
issues that will be explored below.

III. Main ISDS cases brought by Chinese investors
One of the most complicated cases brought by Chinese investors is
Ping An v. Belgium. The case was decided in 2015, but the dispute started
during the 2008 financial crisis. Ping An Life Insurance Company of
China Ltd. and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China Ltd.
(collectively “Ping An”) acquired approximately 4.81 percent of the Fortis
Group from 2007 to 2008, which was worth more than two billion Euros,
and was given the right to appoint a director on the Board.63 The crisis in
the international banking system gave rise to a liquidity problem for
Fortis.64 Eventually, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, acquired
100 percent, 100 percent, and 51 percent of Fortis and its subsidiaries in
each country, respectively.65 As a result, Ping An’s share of Fortis was
expropriated without any compensation.66
In 2005, China and the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union
concluded a new BIT,67 effective in 2009 and replacing the BIT of 1986.68
The 1986 BIT provided that “[a]ll disputes relating to investment” should
be notified to the host state by the investor, and the investor has the option
to either submit to domestic court in the host state or to international
arbitration when there are “disputes relating to the amount of compensation
payable in case of expropriation, nationalization or any other measures

62. L. Yong & D. Yan, 中美双边投资协定谈判：制度因素、核心条款与应对策略
(China-US BIT Negotiations: Institutional Factors, Core Clauses and Coping Strategies),
CASS-IWEP Working Paper No. 201314, Institute of World Economy and Politics, Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences.
63. Supra note 13.
64. Id. ¶¶ 58-59.
65. Id. ¶¶ 60-64.
66. Id. ¶ 62.
67. Agreement between the Government of the People′s Republic of China and the
Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, P.R.C-B.L.E.U, art. 10.2, June 6, 2005 (came into force on Jan. 12, 2009).
68. Id. art. 10.
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similarly affecting investments.”69 The 1986 BIT will remain in force for
ten years from its expiration date with respect to investments made before
the expiration date.70
Under the 2009 BIT, investors can submit to the ICSID for any “legal
dispute” arising between an investor and the host state.71 The 2009 BIT
applies to all investments made before and after the 2009 BIT’s entry into
force, but the 1986 BIT does not govern any dispute or claim concerning
“an investment which was already under judicial or arbitral process before
the 2009 BIT’s entry into force.72
The Ping An dispute arose from the interpretation of the 2009 BIT—
that is, whether it can be interpreted in an expansive way such that it covers
disputes which breached the 1986 BIT.73 Ping An based its claim on the
1986 BIT, but based its jurisdictional argument on the 2009 BIT.74 In its
objections to jurisdiction, Belgium argued, inter alia, that the tribunal
lacked jurisdiction ratione temporis because the dispute arose before the
2009 BIT entered into force on December 1, 2009. But, according to the
Article 8 of the 2009 BIT, the jurisdiction of the tribunal is limited to
disputes after December 1, 2009.75
In accepting this argument, the arbitral tribunal reasoned that the plain
meaning of the 2009 BIT only refers to disputes arising after the 2009 BIT
comes into force.76 The tribunal further pointed out that since Ping An had
already notified the Belgian government that Ping An would take action
based on the 1986 BIT, the dispute arose before the 2009 BIT came into
force, and was therefore not covered by the 2009 BIT.77 This resembles the
narrow approach of the dispute settlement clause of the BIT between China
and Mongolia in a 2017 ICSID case, where the tribunal found restrictive
jurisdiction to any “dispute involving the amount of compensation resulting
from an expropriation.”78 There, the tribunal concluded that even though
the 2009 BIT made clear its intention to replace the 1986 BIT, it does not
69. Id.
70. Id. art. 14.
71. Id. art. 8.
72. Id. art. 10.
73. See supra note 13, ¶ 206.
74. Id. ¶¶ 38, 130.
75. Id. ¶ 113.
76. Id. ¶ 224.
77. Id. ¶ 229.
78. B. Horrigan, T. Furlong & J. Eschment, China-Related Investment Arbitrations:
Three Recent Developments, Herbert Smith Freehills, Arbitration Notes (July 17, 2017),
http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2017/07/17/china-related-investment-arbitrations-threerecent-developments.
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render the tribunal with jurisdiction over disputes that had been notified but
not taken into judicial or arbitral proceedings under the 1986 BIT.79 The
tribunal refused to take an expansive approach partly due to the concern of
over-broadening the range of disputes of a similar nature.80
Both tribunals in the Ping An case and the Mongolia case mentioned
above took a more restrictive approach, which is far from the approach
taken in the Tza Yap Shum case.81 In Tza Yap Shum, the first ISDS case
brought by a Chinese investor, the claimant challenged the government of
Peru for its action that allegedly amounted to expropriation.82 The tribunal
interpreted the wording of “expropriation” to include inherent
expropriation, because to conclude otherwise would undermine the
arbitration clause.83 The tribunal sided with the tribunals in previous cases
that took broad interpretations of “expropriation,” despite the fact that the
tribunal in Tza Yap Shum took into consideration China’s favoritism toward
a narrow interpretation of the clause during its negotiations with Peru.84
This approach is followed by another ISDS case brought by a Chinese
investor against the government of Laos, in which the tribunal broadly
interpreted the dispute settlement clause.85
In summary, an examination of ICSID cases with Chinese complaints
demonstrates the impact of inconsistent interpretations of ISDS provisions
in China’s BITs. The next section further explores other restrictions and
insufficiencies of current ISDS provisions in affording Chinese investors
meaningful remedies against foreign state actions.

IV. Limitations of ISDS Provisions in Practice
A. Vagueness and Inconsistency among different BITs and IIAs
In many earlier BITs and IIAs that China concluded, the provisions
largely varied because their designs were driven by the preferences of the
other signee.86 From the Chinese investors’ perspective, they are equipped
with vague and sometimes overbroad ISDS provisions to challenge host
79. See supra note 13, ¶228.
80. Supra note 13, ¶230.
81. Supra note 33.
82. See Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, supra note 36, and Ping An v.
Belgium, supra note 13.
83. Supra note 75.
84. See Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, supra note 36.
85. Supra note 75.
86. Supra note 32, at 868.
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countries in the international arbitration forums. Even though there have
been only six cases filed with ICSID, and only two of them concluded,
there will likely be an increasing trend of ICSID cases filed by Chinese
investors in the near future.87
For example, the China Railway
Construction Corporation Limited (CRCC) announced in December of
2017 that it is planning to bring the government of Mexico to arbitration for
cancelling CRCC’s successful tender in USD $4 billion worth of highspeed railway project in Mexico.
While the early BITs took a restrictive approach to ISDS provisions,
in a few cases brought by Chinese investors the arbitral tribunals adopted a
rather broad interpretation when deciding the jurisdiction issue.88 The
Mexico-China BIT provided that expropriation, either direct or indirect,
may be compensated.89 Under its arbitration provision, an investor may
submit a claim to arbitration that is due to breach of obligation set forth in
Chapter II of the BIT and as a result causes damages to the investor.90
The “fair and equitable treatment” standard is adopted commonly in
ISDS provisions, but also controversial because of its elastic and constantly
shifting meaning.91 It has been invoked in almost all of the ISDS cases.92
Since 2008, China has been cautiously reforming the “fair and equitable
treatment” standard. As a result, this standard has been written very
differently among different treaties that China has concluded, which may
be the result of different treatments between countries that are partnered
closely with China and those that are not.93

87. See Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru (concluded), supra note 36; Ping An v.
Belgium (concluded), supra note 13; Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd. v.
Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/20 (pending);
Beijing Urban Construction Group Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Yemen (pending), ICSID Case
No. ARB/14/30; Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. United Republic of
Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/41 (pending); Sanum Investments Ltd. v. Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, ICSID Case No. ADHOC/17/1 (pending).
88. See Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, supra note 36; Beijing Urban
Construction Group Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Yemen, id.; Sanum Investments Ltd. v. Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, id.
89. Agreement between the Government of the United Mexican States and the
Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection
of Investments, art. 7, July 11, 2008 (came into force June 6, 2009).
90. Id. art. 13.
91. K. Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent Developments,
Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) 111.
92. See Special Update on Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Facts and Figures, p.1,
Nov. 2017, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf.
93. Supra note 32 at 858–59.
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Similarly, the “indirect expropriation” standard is used frequently
when investors challenge a broad range of state measures that require the
arbitral tribunal to interpret expropriation more expansively.94 Chinese
investors have invoked this standard in a few ISDS cases.95 The most
recent development of this standard in China’s treaties was adopted after
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which gave more
consideration to legitimate public purposes, such as public health and
safety and environment protection.96 However, variance of the “indirect
expropriation” language still exists among different treaties and agreements
China has signed with European and countries from the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).97
The 2010 model BIT drafted by the Ministry of Commerce of China
(MOFCOM) provided that the fair and equitable treatment standard issues
arises when investors are “willfully rejected to fair judicial proceedings or
be treated with obvious discriminatory or arbitrary measures.”98 As
suggested above, the EU-China BIT will also be influenced heavily by
treaties signed between the EU and other countries, especially CETA.
CETA provided an exhaustive list of state acts that would trigger invoking
the fair and equitable treatment: (i) denial of justice in criminal, civil or
administrative proceedings; (ii) fundamental breach of due process,
including a fundamental breach of transparency, in judicial and
administrative proceedings; (iii) manifest arbitrariness; (iv) targeted
discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race or
religious belief; (v) abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress
and harassment; or (vi) a breach of any further elements of the fair and
equitable treatment adopted by the parties’ regular review.99
CETA and the Canada-China BIT adopted similar measures for the
indirect expropriation standard by stating that non-discriminatory measures
protecting legitimate public interests do not constitute indirect

94. Id. at 859.
95. See Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, supra note 36, and Ping An v.
Belgium, supra note 13.
96. Supra note 32.
97. Id. at 859–60.
98. J. Xiao, How can a prospective China-EU BIT contribute to sustainable investment:
in light of the UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, 8 J.
WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 521, 533 (2005).
99. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA) between Canada and the European Union and Its Member States,
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng (last visited Feb. 2, 2018).
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expropriation, as well as providing an illustrative list for such inquiry.100 In
CETA, the list includes the following: (i) the economic impact of the
measure—it has to be clarified that the sole fact of the measure having an
adverse effect on the economic value of an investment in itself does not
give rise to a finding of indirect expropriation; (ii) the duration of the
measure; (iii) the extent to which the measure interferes with distinct,
reasonable, investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the
measure, notably its object, context and intent.101 The Canada-China BIT
provides a similar criteria.102
A precisely-tailored ISDS provision with specific and confined
criteria, as demonstrated in CETA, will provide a clear guide not only to
investors, but also to arbitration tribunals when interpreting the text. This
would also help eliminate the capricious and arbitrary interpretations of the
arbitrators, and further reduce the volatility in investors’ expectations and
preventable suits against host states.

B. Incapacities in providing proper remedies
Varying interpretations of treaty language causes lack of consistency
and uniformity in applying the treaties. As discussed above, the tribunals
in the Ping An case interpreted the ISDS clause narrowly, while the
tribunals in Tza Yap Shum and Sanum cases provided broader
interpretations. The divergent results are partly due to different parts of the
arbitration clauses that were interpreted. However, having a consolidation
mechanism for similar claims or claims arising from similar treaty
provisions would essentially contribute to the coherence of awards, and
increase the likelihood of affording just remedies.103
Inadequate remedy amount is yet another obstacle that foreign
investors have been facing. In a case study of 462 ICSID cases from 1990
to 2014, the tribunals awarded only 30 to 40 percent of the petitioners’
monetary claims on average.104 This figure was even lower in the Tza Yap
Shum case, where the tribunal awarded only USD$78,000 compared to the
loss claimed by petitioner in the amount of USD$25 million. In only six

Supra, note 92.
Supra, note 93.
Canada-China BIT (2012), annex B.10(2).
Supra note 1, at 6.
R. Wellhausen, Recent Trends in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT, 2016, at 1, 4, 19.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

276

2019]

Adopting and Adjusting to the Development of ISDS

277

out of the 462 cases mentioned earlier were there rewards larger than or
equal to what the investors sought.105
Another challenge that foreign investors often deal with in ISDS cases
is state policies in protecting public interests. For example, in the ChinaAustralia FTA, state interests are protected when it is necessary to protect
human life or health; it is necessary to comply with domestic laws and
regulations; it is to protect national treasures; and it is relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources.106 This type of general
exception clause is found in many treaties and shields states behind public
interests. In Philip Morris v. Uruguay, the challenged anti-smoking
legislations were aimed at public health but allegedly injured Philip Morris’
investment interest in Uruguay.107 Nevertheless, the tribunal found that
Uruguay adopted a reasonable regulatory measure to promote public
health.108 Foreign investors may be vulnerable to the volatility of the
policies of host states, especially in countries where political regimes shift
constantly or those with an unstable regulatory environment.
In addition, it is difficult sometimes to enforce the arbitration award
against states. Arbitral awards based on ICSID Convention are subject to
automatic recognition of contracting states, and execution of the awards are
governed by the laws of the foreign states.109 Even if an investor receives a
favorable award, it still has to enforce and execute the award against the
respondent state. This often creates an additional hurdle for investors. The
governments of Argentina, Zimbabwe, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Thailand, and
Venezuela have repeatedly refused to satisfy awards entered against them,
while the governments of Mexico and Romania have been fighting against
the enforcement of arbitral awards against them.110
In some cases where the host states have assets overseas, investors can
go to the courts in those countries and seek enforcement, pursuant to the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards. In a recent arbitration between Venezuela and Resort Mining
Limited, the tribunal found Venezuela violated the Canada-Venezuela BIT
in its action of expropriating Rusoro’s asset in Venezuela.111 After
105. Id. at 27.
106. China-Australia FTA (entered into force on Dec. 20, 2015), art. 9.8.
107. See Philip Morris v. Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, 2, ¶¶
10-11 (July 8, 2016).
108. Id. ¶ 420.
109. ICSID Convention, art. 54.
110. The Changing Practices of International Law (Tanja Aalberts & Thomas
Gammeltoft-Hansen eds., Cambridge 2018), 96–97.
111. Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/12/5, Award, 197, ¶ 904.3 (Aug. 22, 2016).
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Venezuela refused to pay the $1.3 billion award, Rusoro petitioned the U.S.
District Court of Columbia to convert the award into a court judgment and
to execute Venezuela’s assets in the U.S., and the court confirmed the
award.112 As a result, Rusoro is now entitled by American law to discovery
of Venezuela’s state assets around the world, as well as to enforce the
award in more than 140 countries that are signatories to the Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.113 Large
companies with abundant resources like Rusoro can usually pursue
enforcement of the award by using judicial systems in countries that are
parties to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, especially in courts like the American ones that are more
deferential to arbitral awards.

C. Conflicts between the EU and its member states
Foreign investors in European countries may face another obstacle in
the attempt to enforce an award, especially when the cited investment
treaty conflicts with EU laws and regulations. This results in an increasing
number of challenges to the compatibility of intra-EU BITs with EU laws
and regulations. Since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the EU
possesses comprehensive exclusive competence over foreign investment.114
The EU Regulation passed in December 2012 by the European Parliament
provided that the BITs entered into by member states may still remain in
force until a BIT between the EU and the same third country enters into
force.115 This would severely affect investors who want to bring suit
against EU countries based on pre-establishment BIT.
According to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),116 the EU is constitutionally
obligated to comply with its own principles to guide external action
regarding commercial policy. This is particularly relevant to events when a
112. Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 300 F. Supp. 3d 137, 145,
151 (D.D.C. 2018).
113. Brief for Petitioner at 1113, Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez.,
No. 16-cv-2020 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2016).
114. C. Titi, International Investment Law and the European Union: Towards a New
Generation of International Investment Agreements. 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 639, 640 (2015).
115. Regulation (EU) No. 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 December 2012 Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral Investment
Agreements between Member States and Third Countries, 2012 O.J. (L351) 40, 42, art.3.
116. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 21, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012
O.J. (C326) 13; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 205, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C326) 47.
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member state is sued by foreign investors because the state must then take
action to comply with EU’s investment policy. The incompatibilities
between the laws of the EU and a member state arise in several areas, such
as the free transfer of investment-related funds without any exceptions, the
admission and the post-establishment treatment of foreign investments, and
equal treatment of all EU nations.117
For example, in 2013, the court in Micula v. Romania found that
Romania had violated the fair and equitable treatment obligation under the
Sweden-Romania BIT for Romania’s withdrawal of economic incentives,
despite Romania’s claim that its revocation of the incentive program was to
comply with EU law requirement on state aid.118 In March 2015, the
European Commission nevertheless rendered that those incentives are
illegal state aid under EU law, and therefore enjoined Romania from
complying with the award of US$250 million rendered in Micula v.
Romania.119 A decision by an ICSID ad hoc committee was issued in
February 2016, rejecting Romania’s application to annul the award.
In Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV, the Court of Justice of the EU
declared that the arbitration clause in the BIT between the Netherlands and
the then government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was
incompatible with EU law, namely articles 267 and 344 of the TFEU.120
There, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) invalidated the applications
of investor-state arbitration provisions in not just the BIT at issue, but all
intra-EU BITs because the CJEU found the investor-state arbitration
provision undermines the autonomy and direct binding effect of EU laws
on member states.121 This is particularly relevant to the discussion here as
the EU-China BIT negotiations will face the same issue of inconsistency
between EU objectives and its member states.122
The European Parliament announced that the EU-China BIT will be
based on the best practices drawn from the experiences of its member
states, while maintaining its own objectives and standards. A few cases
involving EU countries raised the concern of the enforceability of arbitral
117. S. Schacherer, Can EU Member States Still Negotiate BITs with Third Countries?,
INV. TREATY NEWS (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/08/10/can-eu-memberstates-still-negotiate-bits-with-third-countries-stefanie-schacherer.
118. Ioan Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award (Dec. 11, 2013), 367,
¶ 1329.b.
119. Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015 on State aid SA.38517
(2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) implemented by Romania Arbitral award Micula v Romania of 11
December 2013, 2015 O.J. (L232) 43, 69, ¶¶ 241, 255.
120. Slovak Republic v. Achmea, Case C-284/16 (Mar. 6, 2018).
121. Id. ¶¶ 37, 58-59.
122. Supra note 106, at 651.

279

280

Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 42:1

awards involving incompatibilities between EU laws and intra-EU
treaties.123 There might be an increasing volume of caseloads as a result of
the EU-China BIT and BITs between China and EU member states. From
a pratical point of view, the negotations between China and the EU will
have to tackle the incompatibility issue of the EU laws and the laws of EU
member states.

V. Suggestions for Drafing New BITS from China’s Perspective
A. Confine the Scope of Arbitral Claims
As demonstrated in Ping An v. Belgium, the gap between the 1986
BIT and the 2009 BIT arose out of different scope of claims. The 1986
BIT limited the arbitrable claims to disputes relating to investment, while
the 2009 BIT expanded to any disputes arising between investors and host
states.124 The narrow approach in Ping An is however not universal. In
another concluded ICSID case brought by Chinese investors, the arbitral
tribunals took a rather expansive interpretation of the dispute settlement
clause as discussed above.125
One way to protect investors in foreign investment disputes is to
construct the BIT with confined scopes of arbitrability, as tribunals
construe even slight variations of wording in BITs differently. Indeed,
tribunals have been less reluctant in recent years to broaden their
jurisdiction, even when the dispute settlement clauses are rather
restrictive.126 Some suggested adopting the CETA model, which limits
arbitration to breaches of investment protection obligation.127 In the ChinaMexico BIT and China-Colombia BITs, China abridged the arbitral
tribunal’s space to broadly interpret the BIT by limiting the most favorable
nation clause and tax dispute procedure.128 Both the EU and China would
welcome a limited scope of claims, especially with the rising numbers of
ISDS cases against them in recent years. This could come from a variety of
123. Supra note 112.
124. Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the
Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, art.10, June 4, 1984; Agreement between the Government of the People’s
Republic of China and the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union on the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments, art.8, June 6, 2005.
125. See Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, supra note 36.
126. A. Reinisch, How Narrow Are Narrow Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investment
Treaties? 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 115, 116–17 (2011).
127. Supra note 93, art. 17.
128. Supra note 55.
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ways to construct ISDS clause, from restraining investors from bringing
multiple claims against the host state, to prohibiting tribunals from making
findings against a host state’s domestic laws.129

B. Minimize Uncertainties and Inconsistency
Since many BITs and IIAs overlap with their earlier versions, there
will be an increasing number of disputes where contrasting readings of
different versions of the treaty would hinder the predictability of
arbitration. In Ping An and China Heilongjiang ITCC v. Mongolia,130 both
tribunals took the restrictive approach toward the dispute settlement clauses
in the BITs. For example, the Ping An tribunal pointed out that there was
nothing in the preamble or common clause that indicated a gap-filling by
arbitration tribunal.131 As follows, the new treaty should clarify whether
the status quo in the earlier version of the treaty remains or the new version
will govern disputes notified under the older treaty.132 Both China and the
EU strive to provide a stable investment environment with improved legal
certainties with more specified standards and procedures to follow in the
event of investor-state disputes.
Another likely adoption of provisions from existing BITs, such as
CETA and the Canada-China BIT, will be the consolidation of arbitral
proceedings.133 They both provided clear and concise rules to avoid
inconsistent arbitral awards.134 CETA, for example, limited the ability of
investors to bring parallel proceedings while an investment claim is
pending in order to limit abuse of process and duplicative proceedings.135
Article 8.22(g) of CETA provides that an investor may only submit a claim
if the investor waives its right to initiate any claim or proceeding before a
tribunal or court under domestic or international law with respect to a
measure alleged to constitute a breach referred to in its claim.

129. Supra note 45.
130. Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award Declining to Exercise Arbitral Jurisdiction &
Compel Arbitration, Beijing Shougang Mining Inv. Co. Ltd. v. Mongolia, No. 17 CV 7436,
¶ 451 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017).
131. Supra note 36, ¶ 225.
132. D. Pathirana. Making an Arbitration Claim under Chinese BITs: Some Inferences
from Recent ISDS Cases. 5 CHINA. J. COMP. L. 420, 420–31 (2017).
133. Supra note 92.
134. Id.
135. D. Gonzalez & G. Morello, Parallel Proceeding Problems: The Case for Party
Autonomy (July 5, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/811867/parallel-proceedingproblems-the-case-for-party-autonomy.
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C. Improve Transparency with Procedural Safeguards
Given the confidential nature of the system, the arbitrator appointment
system, and the tendency to award in favor of large multinational
enterprises, ISDS has remained controversial and has been attacked for its
lack of transparency.136 Therefore, it is crucial to implement procedural
safeguards to minimize the risk that comes with lack of transparency. The
Mauritius Convention on Transparency, for example, was designed to
provide an effective mechanism to ensure procedural transparency to
treaty-based investor-state dispute resolutions.137 The Convention was
ratified by Canada, Mauritius, and Switzerland, and has been signed by
nineteen countries including the U.S. and several EU member states.138
The Mauritius Convention on Transparency references the UNCITRAL
Rules on Transparency, where the latter applies to all investor-State
arbitrations regardless of whether the arbitration initiates under
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.139 The UNCITRAL Rules took into
consideration both the public interest and parties’ interest in resolving
disputes in a fair and efficient manner.140 In the event of conflict between
the Rules on Transparency and relevant arbitration rules, the Rules on
Transparency prevail.141 The Rules on Transparency provide some other
devices: publication of information of commencement of arbitration
proceedings and documents such as a statement of claim and defense;
expert reports and witness statements are also available upon public
request; exhibits may be made available upon the arbitral tribunal’s
discretion; and hearings except when it concerns confidential protected
information.142 Incorporating a procedural guidance like the Mauritius
Convention and the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency will significantly
improve transparency in investor-State dispute resolutions, and further the
goal of using the ISDS mechanism.
The EU has been on the frontier of reforming the ISDS system in
response to all of its criticisms discussed in earlier sections. Similar to the
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, CETA has raised a few options for
136. Supra note 109.
137. Bolivia (Plurinational State of) signs the United Nations Convention on
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, UNIS VIENNA (Apr. 17, 2018),
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2018/unisl260.html.
138. Id.
139. United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration art. 2(1).
140. See id. preamble; UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency art. 1(4).
141. UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency art. 1(7).
142. UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency art. 2, 3(1)-(3), 6(1)-(2).
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the China-EU BIT.143 In order to improve transparency, all documents
produced by parties and tribunals, as well as hearings will be open to the
public.144 The tribunal will consist of members selected from a predetermined list of well-recognized arbitrators.145 In addition, there will be
an appellate system to review awards and grant reversal or annulment.146
All of those are proper considerations for the EU-China BIT, given China’s
strong interest in affording a more effective system for its investors.

D. Balance the Interests Between States and Investors
In the recent decade, China’s BITs and IIAs have been heavily
adopting NAFTA and other significant European models of international
treaties. On the one hand, with its rising economic power, China now has
more leverage in negotiating a more coherent BIT with provisions that are
beneficial to Chinese investors. On the other hand, the Chinese
government also needs to shield itself from unjustifiable liabilities and
costs associated with being sued in ISDS cases.147 In many ICSID cases,
investors had sought to expand states’ liabilities in various forms. For
example, in a case brought by the Deutsche Bank AG against the
government of Sri Lanka, the tribunal based its award only on a hedge
agreement, which does not have a physical investment in the host state.148
Investors will continue to use ISDS to challenge state action, and in many
ways may increase pressure on eroding states’ regulatory schemes and
public interests.
In recent years, especially after the initiation of the One Belt and One
Road Project,149 there is a rising concern about China’s commitment to
further its trade and investment policy while maintaining its own regulatory
scheme. The ongoing BIT negotiations with the U.S. and the EU will
143. Supra note 119.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. F. Fontanelli, Does Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) threaten States’
regulatory autonomy? Fact-checking a commonplace of the TTIP debate, SIDIBLOG (Mar.
3, 2015), http://www.sidiblog.org/2015/03/03/does-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isdsthreaten-states-regulatory-autonomy-fact-checking-a-commonplace-of-the-ttip-debate.
149. The One Belt and One Road Project is an initiative brought by China in 2013 and
officially announced in 2015 to joinly develop infrastructure and promote investments with
countries along the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st century Maritime Silk Road.
China Unveils Action Plan on Belt and Road Initiative, The State Council of the The
People’s Republic of China, http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2015/03/28/content_2814
75079055789.htm (last updated Mar. 28, 2015).
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inevitably create challenges to China’s treatment of foreign investment.
For example, China has long rejected the pre-establishment national
treatment provision in BITs, because as a result China must liberalize its
domestic capital markets so that foreign investment can flow in and out
freely.150 In response, some scholars advocated the four-safety-valve
theory to protect China’s state interests: (i) the right of the host state to
consent to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal on a case-by-case
basis, (ii) the requirement that an investor exhaust local remedies before
resorting to international arbitration, (iii) application of the host state's laws
by the investment tribunal, and (iv) exceptions to BITs for essential
national security interests.151
Another factor that is important for China’s state interests lies in the
enormous amount of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In an ICSID case
brought by the Beijing Urban Construction Group (BUCG) against the
government of Yemen, Yemen challenged the BUCG’s function as an
agent for the Chinese government and that it therefore did not qualify to
use the ICSID Convention as a dispute settlement forum.152 The tribunal
found that the assertion that the Chinese government is the decision maker
for BUCG was too remote, and therefore concluded that BUCG was not
performing a government function as an agent for the Chinese
government.153 This case indicated the potential challenges for SOEs and
corporations that are largely backed by the Chinese government, but also
provides that the ICSID will still be available for disputes arising between
Chinese SOEs and the foreign host states.154

VI. Conclusion
Chinese investors are relatively new to the international arbitration
procedures and foreign laws. They might be unfamiliar with layers of
regulatory compliance with the EU and the European host state, or find
themselves to be the victims of drastic political regime shifts. The
inconsistent readings by the arbitral tribunals also severely burden

150. Supra note 125.
151. X. Han, On The Application Of The Principle Of Proportionality In Icsid
Arbitration And Proposals To Government Of The People’s Republic Of China, [2006]
JCULawRw 11; (2006) 13 JAMES COOK UNIV. L. REV. 233, http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/
journals/JCULawRw/2006/11.html#fnB36.
152. Beijing Urban Const. Grp. Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No.
ARB/14/30, Decision on Jurisdiction, 7, ¶ 29 (May 31, 2017).
153. Id. ¶ 43.
154. Supra note 92.
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investors. ISDS has been widely criticized, yet both the EU-China BIT and
U.S.-China BIT are likely to keep this clause, at least in the current status
of negotiation rounds. As China reforms and expands its state policy to
encourage both outbound and inbound investments, we expect to see a
more cohesive ISDS clause that balances the interests between investors
and states.
Generally, courts, and especially arbitral tribunals, respect party
autonomy when interpreting dispute settlement clauses. While keeping in
mind all those potential hurdles in foreign investments, the more proactive
method for China is to minimize the risks during the course of contracting.
Therefore, China’s focus during constructing dispute settlement clauses
should focus on minimizing inconsistency and enhancing transparency,
while taking into consideration maintaining a balance between the state’s
interest and the investor’s interest. This highlights a coherent ISDS system
that can respond to the development of relevant treaties, the changes in
state policies, and the overarching legal and economic environment.
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